Tuesday, October 25, 2005

Facets and Forces - Why isn't this physics?

Carr gives many scales by which to judge systems of thought, international forces, and political perspectives. The fact that he uses them throughout the book as models to illustrate his analysis of the 1919-1939 crisis interested me. However, it bothers me that, with all his attemept to create science of IR as he observes it, he does not attempt a model to aid in the understanding of his point, like a scientist would had done from teh very start.

Following from Kant’s theory and practice, Carr’s theory and practice leads to two new variables: “Political Science must be based on a recognition of the interdependence of theory and practice, which can be attained only through a combination of utopia and reality.” (14) I thought it curious that, though Carr specifically defines that Realism and Utopianism exist on two separate planes (I can’t find the citation! Help!), he says that they are impossible to have at the same time – one solves the problem of being too theoretical and general and one solves the problem of being too concrete and specific. Looking at this from a science perspective, it seems he is comparing things of two entirely different units, like apples and oranges, and, although his balancing act does seem to be the most practical (realist?) way to try to create international governance, it fails to prove that realism and utopianism are mutually replacing schools of thought.

The differences between power and morality, as he puts, I think best, by alluding to the biblical passage “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s” (94). The specific division of these two forces, power and morality, also put them on separate planes – interdependent, but not replacing of eachother.

My mind wants to make a line from realism to utopianism, and generate a point of where international relations currently is, then determine the appropriate magnitude of these “forces” and their specific applications to push it to this ideal balance that Carr says exists, but does not formulate.

In some ways, I prefer the simplicity of Rousseau’s mathematical models to the obscurity of Carr’s…I know he wants to define the ideal structure of international relations by criticizing the ones he sees in play, but it seems to me he is defining a shade of grey: he knows it exists somewhere between black and white, but how to get to it, and what value it really is is difficult for me to theorize. I know, that’s his point. I still wish there was a more concrete and general model for me to look at. Perhaps that will be class.