Being One Being
Rousseau – Substantive
How is Hobbes’ Leviathan different from Rousseau’s general will?
At one point in the social contract Rousseau describes the general will as the body politic. “Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member an indivisible part of the whole”(Rousseau 148). In addition:
At once, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. This public person, formed thus by union of all others formerly took the name city, and at present takes the name republic or body politic, which is called state by its members when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when compared to others like itself” (Rousseau 149).
This description reminded me of Hobbes Leviathan, in the sense that the sovereign is one body with a single voice. But this is where the similarity ends and the distinction is evident.
Hobbes, in describing his Leviathan says of him, “And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; which is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defense” (Hobbes 96). And furthermore, “And he that carryeth this Person, is called Soveraigne, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his subject” (Hobbes 96). These two views of politics are drastically different. I would first like to point out that Rousseau’s body politic is a union of all of the members who are sovereign. By contrast, Hobbes’ Leviathan is a being to which the people secede their liberty through covenants to the commonwealth, which is protected, by way of the sword, by a sovereign that is separated and superior to the people. In the section titled, “On the Liberty of Subject,” Hobbes claims:
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned ill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them (Hobbes 116).
Hobbes acknowledges that man created these artificial chains, civil laws, when they entered the Commonwealth by covenant. Rousseau in the first chapter of Book I references back to Hobbes artificial chains when he acknowledges: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” But Rousseau does not believe that these chains are as useful to the preservation of man as Hobbes would have liked to believe. Rousseau instead proposes that since we cannot return to a state of perfect liberty and throw off the chains that bind us we have no other choice but to make the chains legitimate.
These are just a few thoughts. Perhaps somebody can add to this by offering comparisons/contrasts to other philosophers we have discussed, such as Rousseau’s relentless references back to Machiavelli.
On one last note, I thought this was an interesting quote from Rousseau: “All power comes from God – I admit it – but so does every disease” (Rousseau 143).
How is Hobbes’ Leviathan different from Rousseau’s general will?
At one point in the social contract Rousseau describes the general will as the body politic. “Each of us places his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will; and as one we receive each member an indivisible part of the whole”(Rousseau 148). In addition:
At once, in place of the individual person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life and its will. This public person, formed thus by union of all others formerly took the name city, and at present takes the name republic or body politic, which is called state by its members when it is passive, sovereign when it is active, power when compared to others like itself” (Rousseau 149).
This description reminded me of Hobbes Leviathan, in the sense that the sovereign is one body with a single voice. But this is where the similarity ends and the distinction is evident.
Hobbes, in describing his Leviathan says of him, “And in him consisteth the Essence of the Commonwealth; which is One Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defense” (Hobbes 96). And furthermore, “And he that carryeth this Person, is called Soveraigne, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his subject” (Hobbes 96). These two views of politics are drastically different. I would first like to point out that Rousseau’s body politic is a union of all of the members who are sovereign. By contrast, Hobbes’ Leviathan is a being to which the people secede their liberty through covenants to the commonwealth, which is protected, by way of the sword, by a sovereign that is separated and superior to the people. In the section titled, “On the Liberty of Subject,” Hobbes claims:
But as men, for the atteyning of peace, and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an Artificial Man, which we call a Common-wealth; so also have they made Artificiall Chains, called Civill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned ill Lawes, which they themselves, by mutuall covenants, have fastned at one end, to the lips of that Man, or Assembly, to whom they have given the Soveraigne Power; and at the other end to their own Ears. These Bonds in their own nature but weak, may neverthelesse be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them (Hobbes 116).
Hobbes acknowledges that man created these artificial chains, civil laws, when they entered the Commonwealth by covenant. Rousseau in the first chapter of Book I references back to Hobbes artificial chains when he acknowledges: “Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains.” But Rousseau does not believe that these chains are as useful to the preservation of man as Hobbes would have liked to believe. Rousseau instead proposes that since we cannot return to a state of perfect liberty and throw off the chains that bind us we have no other choice but to make the chains legitimate.
These are just a few thoughts. Perhaps somebody can add to this by offering comparisons/contrasts to other philosophers we have discussed, such as Rousseau’s relentless references back to Machiavelli.
On one last note, I thought this was an interesting quote from Rousseau: “All power comes from God – I admit it – but so does every disease” (Rousseau 143).
posted by Holly at 10:37 PM
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