Analyzing the causes of war and conflict and inaction
Admittedly, I put this one off for awhile. Perhaps waiting for inspiration, perhaps for some kind of divine intervention that would give me some insight into what Waltz’s purpose really was.
I understand his purpose in giving the forces in international conflict a structure – the method of looking at human behavior and intrastate behavior to understand interstate conflict seems so rudimentary I’m surprised it wasn’t so clearly delineated before this book.
I suppose the most interesting thing that the class discussion inspired me to consider was the Geneva Convention. I edited a paper for a friend on it last semester, and the conflicts she identified accurately reflected Waltz’s analysis, but not in the ways the Geneva Convention was discussed in class.
Image one: The president, press, general public opinion thought that the genocide convention was a good idea, especially considering that the holocaust had just happened.
Image two: The internal politics and structure of the US government allowed the convention to get held up in the Senate: the legal ramifications of the convention on the US. Under it, states could be held responsible for acts of genocide, including “mental harm,” which was a case being argued by minority groups. By ratifying the convention, it would supersede state laws and national laws…and members of the senate didn’t want to expose themselves to this scrutiny from US dominant organizations. The senate exercised political power over the president by threatening a constitutional amendment that would limit the president’s rights to make treaties, and this threat was what stopped the convention.
Image three: Even though it was a good idea and much of the rest of the world participated, the US did not enter into the Geneva Convention for FOUR decades (it was finally ratified in 1986).
Without image 2, the idea of image 1 leading to image 3 makes very little sense. The US fear in the ratification of the Geneva Convention was that they would be allowing a world police to moderate their state behavior – something that would not only violate sovereignty but might also put the US in a defensive role against a worldwide “force.” Just as fear of the Soviet Union’s power and ability to vaporize parts of earth unified nations during the cold war, the overarching power of the Convention could unify nations AGAINST the US.
Waltz’s breakdown and forced examination of all parts of the issue is a good tool for understanding these conflict and potential conflict situations…and will warrant a rereading at the end of the course.
I understand his purpose in giving the forces in international conflict a structure – the method of looking at human behavior and intrastate behavior to understand interstate conflict seems so rudimentary I’m surprised it wasn’t so clearly delineated before this book.
I suppose the most interesting thing that the class discussion inspired me to consider was the Geneva Convention. I edited a paper for a friend on it last semester, and the conflicts she identified accurately reflected Waltz’s analysis, but not in the ways the Geneva Convention was discussed in class.
Image one: The president, press, general public opinion thought that the genocide convention was a good idea, especially considering that the holocaust had just happened.
Image two: The internal politics and structure of the US government allowed the convention to get held up in the Senate: the legal ramifications of the convention on the US. Under it, states could be held responsible for acts of genocide, including “mental harm,” which was a case being argued by minority groups. By ratifying the convention, it would supersede state laws and national laws…and members of the senate didn’t want to expose themselves to this scrutiny from US dominant organizations. The senate exercised political power over the president by threatening a constitutional amendment that would limit the president’s rights to make treaties, and this threat was what stopped the convention.
Image three: Even though it was a good idea and much of the rest of the world participated, the US did not enter into the Geneva Convention for FOUR decades (it was finally ratified in 1986).
Without image 2, the idea of image 1 leading to image 3 makes very little sense. The US fear in the ratification of the Geneva Convention was that they would be allowing a world police to moderate their state behavior – something that would not only violate sovereignty but might also put the US in a defensive role against a worldwide “force.” Just as fear of the Soviet Union’s power and ability to vaporize parts of earth unified nations during the cold war, the overarching power of the Convention could unify nations AGAINST the US.
Waltz’s breakdown and forced examination of all parts of the issue is a good tool for understanding these conflict and potential conflict situations…and will warrant a rereading at the end of the course.
posted by Rebecca at 9:52 AM
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