Thucydides - Power Politics in the Truce
Thucydides - Post 1 – Initial Response
Thucydides made several references to the “truce” between Athens and Sparta. At first it seemed that both polis’ were trying to find ways to avoid breaking the truce. As the story progressed though, suspicion and fear ensued and both Athens and Sparta attempted to appear to avoid breaking the truce while making ready for war (Ref: The Spartan Ultimatum). “The general belief [of Athens] was that, whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come”(62). Both sides eventually blamed each other for initially breaking the truce. Athens had fought against Corinth with Corcyra although the peace treaty was still in force (67) and the Peloponnesians had supported the revolt of a city that paid tribute to Athens and had joined the Potidaeans in fighting against Athens (73). “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta” (49)(87); “Sparta is frightened of you and wants war” (55). When examined closer, this situation can be seen to parallel modern interpretations of international relations, in particular that of realism. The play of power politics is evinced throughout the History of the Peloponnesian War. Be it an oligarchy, be it a democracy, behind the veil of ideology, power was turning the wheels of this war. Sparta was threatened by rapidly progressing Athenian empire and wished to keep the Status Quo and prevent Athens from taking over the whole of Hellas, which included preventing the Spartans from eventually being slaves to Athenian rule (106). Athens, virtually flaunting its imperialistic goal, wished to expand its empire and power sphere farther. And as Pericles points out: “Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it: it is certainly dangerous to let it go” (161). Furthermore, Athens became suspicious of Sparta and of losing its own power, so in the spirit of heightening security, it prepared in advance for the eventual war.
Of Course, the History of the Peloponnesian War should not be construed as a handbook for a realist argument in favor of international relations. There are many points in which Thucydides does not coincide with realism. The section dealing with Civil War in Corcyra, for example, explains a break down of societies on account of the war. Different camps of government began to appear within the state, which tore the country apart. Corcyra could not speak as a single entity when dealing with its national interest. There was no national interest, it became every man for himself. The state was not a logical entity, the people in power were hungry for power in greed, ambition, and “ungovernable passions” (245). Corcyra seemed to fall into a Hobbesian state of nature.
Thucydides made several references to the “truce” between Athens and Sparta. At first it seemed that both polis’ were trying to find ways to avoid breaking the truce. As the story progressed though, suspicion and fear ensued and both Athens and Sparta attempted to appear to avoid breaking the truce while making ready for war (Ref: The Spartan Ultimatum). “The general belief [of Athens] was that, whatever happened, war with the Peloponnese was bound to come”(62). Both sides eventually blamed each other for initially breaking the truce. Athens had fought against Corinth with Corcyra although the peace treaty was still in force (67) and the Peloponnesians had supported the revolt of a city that paid tribute to Athens and had joined the Potidaeans in fighting against Athens (73). “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta” (49)(87); “Sparta is frightened of you and wants war” (55). When examined closer, this situation can be seen to parallel modern interpretations of international relations, in particular that of realism. The play of power politics is evinced throughout the History of the Peloponnesian War. Be it an oligarchy, be it a democracy, behind the veil of ideology, power was turning the wheels of this war. Sparta was threatened by rapidly progressing Athenian empire and wished to keep the Status Quo and prevent Athens from taking over the whole of Hellas, which included preventing the Spartans from eventually being slaves to Athenian rule (106). Athens, virtually flaunting its imperialistic goal, wished to expand its empire and power sphere farther. And as Pericles points out: “Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it: it is certainly dangerous to let it go” (161). Furthermore, Athens became suspicious of Sparta and of losing its own power, so in the spirit of heightening security, it prepared in advance for the eventual war.
Of Course, the History of the Peloponnesian War should not be construed as a handbook for a realist argument in favor of international relations. There are many points in which Thucydides does not coincide with realism. The section dealing with Civil War in Corcyra, for example, explains a break down of societies on account of the war. Different camps of government began to appear within the state, which tore the country apart. Corcyra could not speak as a single entity when dealing with its national interest. There was no national interest, it became every man for himself. The state was not a logical entity, the people in power were hungry for power in greed, ambition, and “ungovernable passions” (245). Corcyra seemed to fall into a Hobbesian state of nature.
posted by Holly at 10:59 PM
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